



LINCOLN UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

2010 W. Swain Road
Stockton, CA. 95207

Kelly Dextraze, Superintendent

September 8, 2023

Honorable Judge Michael D. Coughlan
Presiding Judge of the San Joaquin County Superior Court
180 E. Weber Avenue, Suite 1306J
Stockton, CA 95202

RE: Grand Jury Report: “School Safety in San Joaquin County: Developing a Culture of Safety Case No. 0322

Dear Judge Coughlan:

The Lincoln Unified School District (“District”) has reviewed the Facts, Findings and Recommendations in the Grand Jury Report “*School Safety in San Joaquin County: Developing a Culture of Safety*” filed on June 13, 2023. Pursuant to California Penal Code section 933(c), the following constitutes the response of the District and its Governing Board (“Board”) to the findings and recommendations pertaining to matters under the control of the District.

RESPONSE TO FINDINGS 2.0: COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL SAFETY PLAN

F2.1. A review of CSSPs demonstrated many Districts have failed to create a CSSP that addresses safety issues unique to the individual school sites, and rather use a template and/or boilerplate language, leaving the school site unprepared in an emergency.

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: We disagree with the statement that each school site plan is not unique. While we do begin with a template to assure consistency in meeting all of the mandated safety plan requirements, each school sites’ plan is unique to the culture and identity of their school. We utilize a process that engages partners in the development of each school

site's CSSP to assure that each school's individual safety needs are met taking into consideration unique factors of each school. The District utilizes the services of the company More Than Talk LLC, USA Safe Schools in this process, which assigns an advisor to work with each school site on their CSSP.

- F2.2. Many Districts have not involved teachers, support staff, students, and parents/guardians when updating each school site's CSSP, missing an opportunity to create a culture of school safety.**

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: The process of CSSP development and approval in the District occurs through the School Site Council (serving as the school's safety committee) which includes representatives from administration, law enforcement, classified and certificated staff, students (in some cases) and various parent groups. The plans are reviewed by site administration and our Director of Safety and Security, and with each school staff at the beginning of the school year. District office staff reviews each school campus plan in preparation for the plans to be approved by Lincoln Unified Board of Trustees at a regular board meeting.

- F2.3. Many Districts have not collaborated with local law enforcement and other first responders during the annual process to update the CSSP, which could result in a prolonged and inefficient emergency response.**

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: The District always requests and routinely receives collaboration with local law enforcement and first responders and fire agencies, as available. They are critical partners in helping to ensure the safety, security and well-being of our schools. We have strong partnerships with these agencies and receive swift response in most situations. We have never experienced a prolonged or inefficient emergency response. We have our own District Safety and Security department as well as contracts for a School Resource Officer and School Resource Deputy. The police and fire departments are available to us to review and make recommendations to our plans at any time. Each police agency (Stockton Police Department and San Joaquin County Sheriff's Department) is provided a USB fob which can be accessed by any emergency responder via the fire agency (Stockton Fire Department). The District also places a Knox box containing the same USB fob, copy of the school's CSSP, and a grand master key which can be accessed by any emergency responder via all agencies.

- F2.4. Many District CSSPs show a lack of meaningful collaboration between Districts and local law enforcement agencies, causing confusion and chaos during an emergency.**

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: The District has an ongoing and collaborative partnership with our Police, Sheriff and Fire Departments. These relationships have afforded us many opportunities to work together to address various issues regarding the safety of our students and school communities. There are standing relationships within and across these agencies which support effective interaction during emergencies and other times of need.

F2.5. Many Districts do not offer an opportunity for public input during the drafting or approval stages of the annual CSSP, which renders the Districts out of compliance with State law.

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(1).)

Explanation: Each school site is required to complete a comprehensive safety plan annually with the opportunity for public input. The process includes development and review of the plan through our School Site Councils at each school, review by administration, law enforcement, staff, students in some cases and various parent groups. It is approved by each school site council which serves as each school's safety committee. Prior to the board meeting in which plans are placed on the agenda, we address any questions or comments related to the plans. There is always opportunity for public comment prior to approval by the Board of Trustees.

F2.6. Most Districts do not include an assessment of the status of crime at the school and school related functions in their CSSPs, which renders the Districts out of compliance with State law and causes potential harm and liability.

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: We include a link to a map hosted by crime stoppers that shows crime stats around our school sites. This is in section 7 of our plans.

F2.7. Many Districts do not adequately address the unique needs of students with disabilities during emergencies. The lack of planning for the most vulnerable students can cause harm during a time of confusion and crisis.

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: Students with special needs are addressed in the CSSPs. At the beginning of the school year each school principal meets with staff (teachers) as well as other school professionals such as the psychologist, nurse, mental health clinician when a student has specific needs or accommodations to ensure that the unique needs of students with

disabilities are met. Individual Educational Plan and 504s are reviewed for pertinent information in conjunction with outreach to students' parents or guardians. Additionally, information may be found in the section for evacuating students with special needs. Students with special needs participate in all emergency and safety drills and procedures to minimize confusion and unforeseen challenges in times of crisis or emergency.

- F2.8. A few Districts do not make any part of the CSSPs available to the public, withholding important information about steps taken by the District to reduce the probability and impact of safety risks. Other Districts post the CSSPs in their entirety, failing to keep confidential information about tactical responses, potentially revealing sensitive information to the public.**

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: The District safety measures are referred to in student handbooks, the district's transportation safety plan, each school's SARC, and our board policies and administrative regulations. Parents may contact their school principals or our Safety and Security Department for specific questions regarding safety measures.

- F2.9. Many Districts have CSSPs that fail to identify incident command roles and the individuals who are to perform those roles in case of an emergency, exposing students and staff to the potential for confusion and increased risks during an emergency.**

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: All of our CSSPs have identified incident command information and a crisis notification structure in place. These sections of the plan include the roles and the names/titles of the persons who are to perform specific assigned duties in the event of an emergency. All District school administrators are required to take ICS 100 for Schools and are provided a real time ICS table top program for administrators (Principals, teachers, secretaries and custodians). The District also provides individuals in these positions with proprietary technology that helps them with the ICS management in real time, which can be shared amongst those who need to know.

- F2.10. Many Districts have CSSPs that fail to describe the system to reunite parents/guardians with their children in the event of a campus wide evacuation, creating confusion and additional anxiety in the event of a safety emergency.**

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: Each of our school's CSSP has a detailed reunification plan included. In addition, the District contracts with SHARE 911, a vendor which assists in the real time process of reunification and emergency notifications.

F2.11. Many schoolsite CSSPs do not account for specific dangers unique to the school site (e.g., train tracks, flooding, freeways).

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: We utilize information provided to us by the county with regard to local vulnerabilities and address them in our plans and evacuation routes. The District includes anything that can serve as a threat, e.g. planes, trains, automobiles, rivers, jails, county houses and even local registered sex offenders.

RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS 2.0: COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL SAFETY PLAN

R2.1. By March 1, 2024, the annual updates for each school site's CSSP address safety issues unique to the site.

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: It has always been and will continue to be our practice that all CSSPs will be developed and approved prior to March 1 of each year, including safety issues unique to each site.

R2.2 By December 15, 2023, while updating the school's CSSP, each school site collaborate and receive input from representatives of teachers, support staff, students, and parents/guardians.

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: This recommendation is implemented annually although not always by December 15, but always prior to approval of the plans by March 1.

R2.3. By December 15, 2023, while updating the school's CSSP, each school site collaborates and receives input from the appropriate emergency response agencies.

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: This recommendation is implemented annually although not always by December 15, but always prior to approval of the plans by March 1. Receiving this input is often dictated by the agencies' availability.

- R2.5. By February 1, 2024, each school site council or safety planning committee hold an advertised public meeting at the school site to allow members of the community an opportunity to express an opinion about the school's proposed CSSP as required by California Education Code Sections 32288(b)(1) and (2).**

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: Each school site council holds at least one meeting prior to final approval of the plans by March 1, to allow for input on the development of the plans.

- R2.6. By March 1, 2024, each school site's CSSP includes the State mandated assessment of the status of crime at the school and school-related functions.**

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: This has been and will continue to be a practice related to the development of our CSSPs.

- R2.7. By March 1, 2024, each school site consult with the appropriate professionals to address the unique needs of students with disabilities when updating the CSSP.**

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: The safety of students with special needs are annually addressed in the development of the CSSP and the ongoing input of professionals who serve students with disabilities at each school site. These students participate in all drills and exercises related to safety.

- R2.8. By March 1, 2024, each school site's CSSP be available to the public with the exception of confidential information about tactical responses.**

Response: This recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable (with explanation). (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(4).)

Explanation: We do not believe that sharing the CSSPs is appropriate and that doing so may put students and staff in harm's way. We are happy to answer questions and provide information about components of the plans that are in place to increase safety. This is also the recommendation of our partners at Safe Schools USA.

- R2.9 By March 1, 2024, each school site's CSSP identify the incident command roles and the individuals who are to perform those roles and their alternate in cases of an emergency.**

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: Our CSSPs identify incident command roles as well as identifying who will perform them in the event of various types of emergencies.

R2.10 By March 1, 2024, each school site's CSSP describe the system to reunify parents/guardians with their student in the event of a campus-wide evacuation, including how parents/guardians are informed of reunification details.

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: Our CSSPs identify reunification plans and processes, including how parents are informed.

R2.11 By March 1, 2024, each school site's CSSPs account for dangers unique to the specific school site (e.g., train tracks, flooding, freeways).

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: Our CSSPs account for dangers identified in county vulnerability studies and will continue to utilize input from our partners in law enforcement to assure we have up to date information about potential hazards.

RESPONSE TO FINDINGS 3.0: TRAINING

F3.2 Some of the Districts failed to send representatives to the 2022 School Safety Summit, thereby missing an opportunity to work together to make schools safer.

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: Our district sent a large team to the summit, including Superintendent, site administrators, our Director of Safety and Security, our Director of Child, Welfare and Attendance and our SRO and SRD.

F3.3 The Grand Jury learned through interviews, surveys, and site tours that many Districts fail to include safety topics during regular meetings with teachers and support staff throughout the school year, minimizing the importance of safety.

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: Safety drills are regularly practiced by teachers and support staff at each school. We do see the need for more regular discussion at staff meetings and intend to add this to our practices this school year. Safety topics, including drill procedures, are placed on administrative agendas and continue to be analyzed and reviewed, and the Superintendent and Director of Safety and Security meet weekly to analyze safety needs in the district.

F3.4 The Grand Jury learned through interviews, surveys, and site tours that many school sites fail to assure substitute staff receive the information they will need in the case of a school safety emergency, leaving the substitute staff ill-prepared for an emergency

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: Each school site provides substitutes with the necessary information regarding the emergency procedures in their sub folder, including where the safety flipcharts are located with class lists and emergency evacuation routes. We have recently added a QR code with a link to a short video describing all of our safety protocols to the Sub Folders at each school site.

F3.5 Many Districts fail to include the utilization of communication and incident command protocols (ICS-100) during safety drills throughout the school year, causing miscommunication in an emergency.

Response: Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: We have many references in our plans to Share 911 which we use for our emergency communication during an emergency. We also use Parent Square to provide parents with information. These resources incorporate many of the incident command protocols in ICS-100. Additionally, we intend to add completion of ICS-100 for all site administrators by October 1, 2023.

F3.6 Many district cabinet level positions (e.g. Superintendent, Chief Business Officer) are not trained in ICS protocols (ICS-402), causing a lack of unified response to Districtwide emergencies

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: ICS 402 is for recommended for Executive Public Safety Personnel and although we do not use this specifically for training, our Cabinet level staff are trained to respond to district wide emergencies. Our Director of Safety and Security has completed this training. We are reviewing the usefulness of this training for our purposes on a broader scale.

F3.7 Many school sites do not vary the time of day when routine safety drills are conducted or when students are not in classrooms, making drills predictable and leaving students unprepared for emergencies that may occur at any time.

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: Principals schedule safety drills throughout the year. These drills are conducted on different days, at different times and while students are in various locations on campus. Records of safety drills including times conducted are maintained at each site.

F3.8 Many school sites fail to include support staff (classified personnel) in probable real-life roles during safety drills, leaving them unprepared to assist students in emergencies.

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: Classified staff participate in safety drills and trainings to ensure preparedness for potential real life safety issues. Both school site and district office administrators ensure that all support staff participate in safety drills.

F3.9 Most school sites fail to conduct a post-incident report after drills analyzing what went well, what went wrong, and what needs to be changed in the future to improve plans and drills, undermining the effectiveness of drills.

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: Following each drill principals debrief the incident with our Director of Safety and Security. Information is shared with district leadership, including Maintenance and Operations and the Superintendent.

RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS 3.0: TRAINING

R3.2 By December 1, 2023, each school District send one or more representatives to the annual School Safety Summit hosted by the San Joaquin County Office of Education.

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: We will continue to participate in this summit.

R3.3 By September 1, 2023, safety topics be an agenda item at all school site staff meetings with teachers and support staff throughout the school year.

Response: This recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable (with explanation). (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(4).)

Explanation: We agree that more routine discussion of safety items at staff meetings would be valuable and intend to implement this as possible this year. There may be instances where it is not practicable to do at every staff meeting, depending on scope, content, and time of the meeting.

R3.4 By September 1, 2023, Districts develop, adopt, and implement written procedures for school sites to provide substitute staff with the information they will need in case of a school emergency.

Response: This recommendation has been implemented and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: Substitutes have information needed should there be an emergency and we have added information to the materials received by each substitute so that they are well prepared. There is a link to a short training video and they have daily access to our emergency reporting platform.

R3.5 By October 1, 2023, personnel identified in the school CSSP for incident command roles be trained and certified in ICS-100 protocols.

Response: This recommendation has not been implemented, but will be implemented. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(2).)

Explanation: We have partial implementation of this and will develop a plan for all personnel identified for incident command roles to receive this training by December 1, 2023.

R3.6 By October 1, 2023, ICS-402 training be completed for all District-level executive leadership.

Response: Response: This recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable (with explanation). (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(4).)

Explanation: This training is not recommended by our safety consultants, Safe Schools USA. Our Director of Safety and Security has completed this training. We will however, discuss with our consultants and consider its use moving forward.

R3.7 By October 1, 2023, scheduled safety drills be conducted on different days throughout the school year and at various times throughout the school day, including when students are not normally in their classrooms.

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: We will continue to implement this practice already in place.

R3.8 By October 1, 2023, scheduled safety drills include support staff (classified) in probable emergency roles during the year and document their participation.

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: We will continue to implement this practice already in place.

R3.9 By October 1, 2023, administrators create a post-incident report after all safety drills.

Response: This recommendation has been implemented and will continue to be implemented moving forward. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: Our Share 911 platform generates a post incident report which is reviewed by the site administration in collaboration with our Safety Officers and ultimately with the Superintendent. We will continue to debrief all safety drills and develop next steps and/or adjustments to our actions

RESPONSE TO FINDINGS 4.0: SCHOOL SITE VISITS

F4.1 Not all school sites have check-in procedures in place that were followed consistently, posing serious security threats.

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: All of our schools and offices have a check in procedure in place that is followed consistently. All visitors are required to provide identification, sign-in and receive a visitor badge. Upon leaving the school, visitors are required to sign out and return their visitor badge. We utilize a system to scan visitors against criminal data bases.

F4.2 Perimeter fencing or an “open” campus each pose security challenges and require careful consideration to mitigate security shortcomings.

Response: The District agrees with this finding. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(1).)

Explanation: The District has completed vulnerability studies at all our campuses and most have perimeter fencing creating closed campuses. Our comprehensive high school campus will be undergoing some construction to add some additional fencing though it will not create a fully closed campus. We do have a visitor kiosk where visitors are checked in and their identity verified and we have increased campus supervisor and Safety Officer staff during school hours.

F4.3 Evacuation maps that are posted inconsistently or do not adequately illustrate evacuation routes cause confusion and prolonged evacuation times, making staff and students vulnerable to harm in both classrooms and common areas.

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: We have maps posted in every room that show that classrooms primary, and secondary evacuation routes. We also provide staff with the My-EOP app that show all evacuation maps, on-site, and off-site.

F4.4 Inconsistent door-locking policies and failure to follow policies create opportunities for perpetrators to enter classrooms and common areas.

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: We require all doors to be closed and locked during school hours at all campuses. We have secure entries at each school office.

F4.5 Most school sites utilized flip charts that identify steps to be taken in case of emergencies, however, none of the sites posted them in all rooms used by students, staff, parents/guardians, and the general public.

Response: The District disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: We have flip charts in every room used by students, staff, and the public. We also offer a digital app that includes the same information for interested staff members.

F4.6 Insufficient window coverings give perpetrators a clear line of sight, creating risk for students and staff.

Response: The District agrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(1).)

Explanation: The District agrees that insufficient window coverings give perpetrators a clear line of sight, creating risk for students and staff. Our school windows should all have shades or coverings on them, and each site has the means to address needs in this area should they arise.

F4.7 Most school sites, regardless of age, were well maintained and showed school pride. One school site demonstrated multiple maintenance shortcomings, which can negatively impact safety.

Response: The District agrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(1).)

Explanation: Our schools are well maintained and demonstrate our school and district pride. We agree that maintenance shortcomings may negatively impact student safety, and make every effort to assure that our schools do not experience this.

- F4.8 Good relationships among administrators, certificated and classified staff, parents, and students are vital to promptly identify and address areas of concern, particularly regarding student behavior. Relationships varied greatly from campus to campus.**

Response: The District agrees with this finding. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(1).)

Explanation: As a district we place great value on relationships and strive to build and maintain solid relationships across all groups.

- F4.9 The culture of safety is best developed by public transparency and involvement by all parties. Few of the school sites visited by the Grand Jury demonstrated meaningful public engagement in safety planning.**

Response: The District agrees and disagrees with this finding as it applies to the District. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(a)(2).)

Explanation: We agree that safety is best developed by transparency and stakeholder involvement. We disagree that our district has not had meaningful public engagement in safety planning. We engage staff, students, families, and administration in the development of safety plans. We seek input from local law enforcement. We utilize the expertise of our safety consultants from Safe Schools USA, and our Safety and Security department.

RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS 4.0: SCHOOL SITE VISITS

- R4.1 By October 1, 2023, each school site implements an access control program that consistently includes verifying visitors' identity and collection of any issued badge before the visitor leaves the school site.**

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: This recommendation is already in place at all our schools and will continue to be our practice.

- R4.2 By March 1, 2024, Districts develop, adopt, and implement a plan for effective perimeter control of access at all school sites.**

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: We have effective perimeter control plans at all but one of our school sites., One school site has plans in place to further limit perimeter access, using recommendations from staff, our Safety and Security department, local law enforcement and our consultants at Safe Schools. We will continue to routinely assess vulnerabilities at each school and address areas identified for further consideration.

R4.3 By September 1, 2023, all school sites post evacuation maps clearly showing routes from the “You Are Here” perspective be prominently posted at each entry or exit door location in both classrooms and common areas.

Response: This recommendation has not been fully implemented, but the “You Are Here” notes are currently being added to the Emergency maps. (Pen. Code § 933.05(b)(2).)

Explanation: The district will ensure that all evacuation maps are clearly posted and note “you are here” at each entry and exit location in classrooms and common areas.

R4.4 By March 1, 2024, Districts develop, adopt, and implement a plan for door-locking policies to secure classroom and common area doors.

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: We have this practice in place already and will continue its implementation.

R4.5 By March 1, 2024, all school sites post flip charts or similar summaries of emergency procedures be posted in all classrooms and common areas.

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: We have this practice in place already and will continue its implementation.

R4.6 By March 1, 2024, all school sites ensure window coverings are provided for all windows, thereby not allowing a perpetrator a clear line of sight into a classroom or common area.

Response: This recommendation was implemented at all times prior to the Grand Jury Report and will continue to be implemented in the future. (Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(1).)

Explanation: We have this practice in place already and will continue its implementation.

R4.7 By October 1, 2023, the Board of Trustees, during a public meeting, review and discuss the findings and recommendations of the 2022-2023 San Joaquin County Civil Grand Jury report, Case #0322 – School Safety in San Joaquin County: Developing a Culture of Safety.

Response: This recommendation has not been implemented, but will be implemented.
(Pen. Code, § 933.05(b)(2).)

Explanation: The Board of Trustees will review and discuss the findings and recommendations of the 2022-2023 San Joaquin County Civil Grand Jury report, Case #0322 – School Safety in San Joaquin County: Developing a Culture of Safety at the first public meeting after the District has filed its response to this Report,

CONCLUSION

On behalf of the Board of Trustees of the Lincoln Unified School District, we appreciate your concern for our District.

Sincerely,



Kelly Dextraze
Superintendent

